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RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER. An Annual Review of Church
and State and of Religion, Law and Society, The Institute of Church
and State, Villanova University School of Law. Edited by Donald
A. Giannella. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1964. Pp. x,
338. $6.
One of the many anomalies and even mysteries surrounding
church-state relations in America has been the absence, until very
recently, of any apparent need for decisional law on church-state
issues by the United States Supreme Court. From 1790 until 1947,
this nation resolved virtually all of its problems regarding religion
and the law without recourse to the nation's highest tribunal.
In its Everson opinion in 1947,1 the Supreme Court for the first
time entered the most complex area in the whole range of churchstate problems-the relationship between religion and education.
In the generation from Everson to the Bible-reading cases in 1963,
the question of religion and the law became one of the thorniest and
most emotional issues in contemporary jurisprudence.
Because of the urgency and importance of America's rapidly developing church-state problems, all of us are deeply indebted to
Villanova University School of Law for initiating the publication
of an annual critical analysis of contemporary church-state statutory
and decisional law. The first volume in this series, here under review,
has set a tone of scholarship and ecumenism which will not easily
be duplicated or maintained.

1. Everson v. Board of Educ., !J!JO U.S. 1 (1947).
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Two of the most useful articles of the eleven essays in this
volume are a summary of church-state literature written by Professor Donald A. Giannella of Villanova Law School2 and a comprehensive survey of the extra-judicial literature on church and
state authored by Professor Thomas J. O'Toole of Georgetown
University Law Center.3 In the former, Professor Giannella devotes
some seventy-five pages to a summary of all the significant churchstate decisions that were issued in the period from September 1962
to September 1963; this survey does not, however, deal with the
decisions relating to Bible-reading and the recitation of prayers in
public schools since the able Professor Paul G. Kauper of the University of Michigan Law School has a separate and splendid article
on this one phase of recent church-state controversy4-an article
which will be discussed later in this review.
Professor O'Toole's critical analysis of books issued during the
survey year is a complete and candid review of most of the volumes
that are relevant to the question of the place of religion in American
life. Professor O'Toole concludes that, while most of the authors
now writing about church-state problems are adept in describing
and dissecting past resolutions of these issues, they do not have this
same facility when dealing with the problems of disestablishment
and religious pluralism in contemporary society.
Each of the other essays in this unique and important annual
review merits the most careful attention and appraisal. Professor
Paul Ramsey of Princeton University is the author of an article that
deals less with the law as such but, in a certain sense, pinpoints
more than any of the other essays the deepest issues with which
American law must deal when it seeks to make policy regarding
morality and religion. In "Marriage Law and Biblical Covenant,"5
Professor Ramsey perceptively comments on the unexplored and
· ambiguous role which the state plays when, by granting a divorce,
it "dissolves" a valid marriage. His insights point to the prospective
legal controversies which will arise when the contemporary acceptance of the many anomalies in American family law is challenged.
With characteristically critical comments on Protestant thought
and conduct, Professor Franklin H. Littell of Chicago Theological
Seminary6 opens fire on "the more turbulent defenders of the old
Protestant hegemony.'' 7 In Professor Littell's judgment, the failure
of Protestant groups to fill the vacuum left by the outlawing of a
certain Protestant "culture-religion" in American schools may well
2. Pp. 245-320.
3. Pp. 218-44.

4. Pp. 3-40.
5. Pp. 41-77.
6. Pp. 78-98.

7. P. 86.

January 1965]

Recent Books

573

result in the emergence of "a totalitarian combination of . . . 'nonsectarian religion,' nationalism and ... racialism." 8 The possibility
of such a "demonic thrust" in America can be inferred "if we ...
read aright the experience in other so-called Christian nations
during the last two generations." 9
One of the most searching inquiries in all of recent church-state
writings is Columbia University Professor Harold Stahmer's essay
entitled "Defining Religion: Federal Aid and Academic Freedom."10
Not everyone will agree with Professor Stahmer's conclusion that
"the principle of neutrality [between government and religion] ...
has the effect of reading both of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment in light of the establishment clause at the expense of
the free exercise clause." 11 But it would appear difficult for anyone
to repudiate Professor Stahmer's assertion that no purely legal definition of religion can resolve "the question of federal assistance to
accredited institutions of higher learning since the underlying issue
involves an undeniable fundamental question of academic freedom."12
Other major essays in this first volume of Villanova's new
church-state annual review are authorized by Richard L. Robinstein,13 Theodore L. Reller,1-1 and Milton R. Konvitz; 15 five shorter
comments are also included.
The part of this collection that probably makes the most lasting
contribution to jurisprudential thought on church-state relations
is the brilliant essay, "Schempp and Sherbert: Studies in Neutrality
and Accommodation," by one of America's leading authorities on
the first amendment, Professor Paul G. Kauper. 16
It is not widely known or recognized that the Supreme Court,
on the very day in June 1963 when it declared Bible-reading in
public schools to be unconstitutional, also ruled that South Carolina
could not deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist
who was unable to secure a job because she could not, in conscience,
work on Saturday. It is the latter Sherbert11 decision which Professor
Kauper analyzes along with the more famous Schempp opinion.1s
Taking these two rulings together, Professor Kauper reasons that
neither the concept of neutrality nor the "no-aid-to-religion" norm is
8. P. 87.
9. Ibid.
IO. Pp. 116--46.
11. P. 139.
12. P. 146.
13. Pp. 147-69.
14. Pp. 170-94.
15. Pp. 99-115.
16. Pp. 3-40.
17. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
18. School DisL v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (19b3).
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a viable test. One must add to these theories the emphasis in Sherbert
where the Supreme Court required South Carolina to accommodate
its legislative policy to promote or further religious beliefs, activities
and interests. The Sherbert ruling, in Professor K.auper's judgment,
has gone farther than any other decision of the Court "in sustaining
a claim under the free exercise clause."19 Sherbert, moreover, makes
it clear "that the Court rejects the notion that the religious factor
cannot be considered a basis for a legislative classification that results
in promoting or giving aid to religion." 20
In view, therefore, of the enlargement of the concept of religious
liberty in Sherbert and the new emphasis on neutrality in Schempp,
Professor Kauper feels that "facing and realizing the implications
of Sherbert may prove to be the Court's most important future
task." 21 Professor Kauper does not, however, assert or imply any
necessary contradiction between Sherbert and Schempp. He asserts
rather-as the concluding judgment of his essay-that "perhaps the
ultimate lesson to be drawn from the two cases is that the Court
regards religious liberty as the central value served by the First
Amendment's religion clauses and that it is prepared to follow a
policy of wholesome and benevolent neutrality as the means of best
serving this value."22
Only future history will reveal whether benevolent neutrality
as spelled out in Schempp can adjust to and accommodate the fulsome religious freedom vindicated in Sherbert. All of us will continue to be grateful that Villanova will each year present to the
world a volume containing the best critical views on this enormously important subject.

Rev. Robert F. Drinan, S. ].,
Dean, Boston College Law School
19.
20.
21.
22.

P. 31.
Pp. 32-33.
P. 40.
Ibid.

